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(One of the section 6501(e) cases is 
discussed in my article, intermountain 
and the Importance of Administrative 
Law in Tax Law, Tax NoTes, Aug. 23, 
2010, at 837. Mayo and other cases are 
discussed in my article, Mayo and the 
Future of Tax Regulations, published in 
the March 28 issue of Tax Notes.)
This article addresses an interesting 
and potentially significant aspect of one 
of the cases involving the section 6015(f) 
regulations. The Tax Court has repeatedly 
held the regulation in question, section 
1.6015-5(b)(1), to be invalid, and the 
action has shifted to the circuit courts. 
The sixth Circuit has yet to weigh in. Hall 
v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. no. 19 
(2010), on appeal no. 10-2628 (6th 
Cir.). Two other circuits have. Three-judge 
panels have reversed the Tax Court and 
upheld the validity of the regulation in 
Lantz v. Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 
(7th Cir. 2010), rev’g 132 T.C. 131 
(2009), and Mannella v. Commissioner, 
2011 WL 149379 (3d Cir. Jan. 19, 
2011), rev’g 132 T.C. 196 (2009).
Five of the six judges on the Lantz and 
Mannella appellate panels saw the 
regulation as valid. The sole exception 
was Judge Ambro in Mannella. Like the 
other five appellate judges, Judge Ambro 
rejected the Tax Court’s view that the 
regulation is invalid at Chevron step One. 
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.s. 837, 842 (1984).
instead, Judge Ambro thought the 
regulation invalid on a different theory: 
that the regulation fails at Chevron step 
Two because “the irs has not advanced 
any reasoning for its decision to impose 
a two-year limitations period on 
taxpayers seeking relief under [6015(f)], 
leaving us no basis to conduct the 
analysis mandated by Chevron step two.” 
2011 WL 149379 at *11. A month after 
Mannella, the Court of Federal Claims 
rejected a “failure to explain” challenge 
to a regulation under section 263A. 
Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United 
States, 2011 WL 722970, at *21-22 
(Ct. Fed. Cl. Feb 25, 2011).
This Article addresses the “failure to 
explain” argument. part i describes the 
administrative law obligation on 
agencies to explain the bases of their 
regulatory choices. part ii evaluates that 
obligation in the Mannella–Lantz–Hall 
context. part iii addresses the potential 
of the “failure to explain” argument 
when taxpayers challenge tax regula-
tions in other contexts.
i. agencies’ obligation 
to explain
numerous cases have held that 
administrative agencies are required to 
explain why they made the regulatory 
choices they did and that the agency’s 
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the validity of tax regulations has been challenged by taxpayers almost as long as there have been tax regulations. now, however, we are in a period of unusually high activity on this front. the supreme Court recently upheld the validity of a 
regulation under section 3121 in Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 131 s. Ct. 704 (2011); many 
cases are testing the validity of regulations extending the six-year statute of limitations under section 6501(e) to basis overstate-
ments (or, as the service would put it, clarifying the law in this regard); and many cases are testing the validity of regulations 
imposing a two-year limitations period on claims for equitable spousal relief under section 6015(f).
position can be reversed or, more 
frequently, remanded to the agency for 
better explanation before the position or 
rule can become effective. Judges and 
commentators have looked to various 
sources as the basis of the obligation to 
explain, including the Administrative 
procedure Act (“ApA”) (5 U.s.C. 
§§ 553(c), 557(c), or 706(2)), adminis-
trative common law, Chevron step Two, 
or the U.s. Constitution, including the 
delegation doctrine, other aspects of the 
separation of powers principle, and the 
Due process and Equal protection 
components of the Fifth Amendment.
Wherever the obligation may be 
located, numerous cases have invoked 
it. some of the cases predated the 
proliferation of agencies in the new 
Deal Era. E.g., American Express Co. v. 
South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U.s. 
617 (1917).
Another plank in the doctrine was 
added by the Chenery cases decided 
near the time of the enactment of the 
ApA. it is settled that a statute can be 
upheld—even if Congress articulated no 
reason (or a constitutionally defective 
reason) for it—as long as the court can 
devine or devise an acceptable reason. 
similarly, an appellate court can affirm a 
lower court’s decision—even if the 
decision rests on an erroneous founda-
tion—if the appellate court can identify a 
sufficient alternative rationale. Chenery 
teaches that this is not the case with 
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respect to acts by agencies: “an 
administrative order [or, as subsequent 
cases have established, an administra-
tive regulation] cannot be upheld unless 
the grounds upon which the agency 
acted in exercising its powers were those 
upon which its action can be sustained.” 
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.s. 80, 95 
(1943), additional opinion, 332 U.s. 
194 (1947).
increased judicial suspicion of 
agencies in the 1960s and 1970s gave 
rise to more rigorous review known as 
“hard look” review. integral to such 
review was scrutiny of the agency’s 
asserted reasons for its choice and 
correlation of those reasons with the 
purposes of the statute—rationality 
review. in the “hard look” tradition, the 
supreme Court decided the State Farm 
case, repeating the Chenery injunction 
and holding that “an agency must 
cogently explain why it has exercised its 
discretion in a given manner.” Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. 
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 
463 U.s. 29, 48 (1983).
ii. obligation to explain 
in Mannella
Judge Ambro considered, and found 
deficient, four rationales asserted by the 
government in support of the challenged 
regulation: (1) the absence of a two-year 
deadline for section 6015(f) claims would 
render superfluous the statutory two-year 
deadline for section 6015(b) claims, (2) 
the service can exercise its discretion 
under section 6015(f) to exclude a class 
of claimants (those who delay filing their 
claims), (3) the regulation is an exercise 
of the delegation to create procedures 
governing relief, and (4) the regulations 
reduce to manageable proportions the 
volume of claims for relief.
More important than his particular 
responses to the above rationales was 
the general response Judge Ambro 
essayed. in their various public pro-
nouncements on the regulation, Treasury 
and the service stated no reasons for 
imposing the two-year limitations period 
as to section 6015(f) equitable claims. 
reasons were advanced in briefs in 
Mannella, but under Chenery and State 
Farm (both cited by Judge Ambro) post 
facto justifications by lawyers for the 
agency cannot take the place of 
contemporaneous explanation by the 
agency itself. E.g., State Farm, 463 U.s. 
at 50 (“it is well established that an 
agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, 
on the basis articulated by the agency 
itself.”).
neither of the judges in the Mannella 
majority responded to Judge Ambro’s 
“failure to explain” argument. The 
government did not have the opportunity 
to do so because, contrary to the usual 
rules of appeals, Judge Ambro’s dissent 
raised the argument sua sponte. it had 
not appeared in the briefs or oral 
argument in the case.
However, the government’s opening 
brief in Hall pending before the sixth 
Circuit did address the argument. There 
have been many explanation cases since 
State Farm was decided in 1983. The 
government argued in its sixth Circuit 
brief that, in light of Verizon (one of those 
subsequent cases), “Judge Ambro’s 
criticism is . . . completely miscon-
ceived.” specifically, the government 
maintained that State Farm applies only 
when an agency changes course, not 
when it is “taking a position in the first 
instance,” which it was in the section 
6015(f) regulation. Brief of Appellant, 
Hall v. Commissioner, no. 10-2628, at 
58 (Jan. 26, 2011) (citing Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.s. 
467, 502 n.20 (2002)).
i do not find the government’s 
response convincing. State Farm did 
involve an agency changing its position, 
but numerous other “hard look” and 
explanation cases dealt with initial 
positions, not changed positions. The 
government may be confusing what is 
accidental in one case with what is 
essential in a line of cases.
The government’s argument is hard to 
square with Fox, a 2009 supreme Court 
decision refining State Farm. The Fox 
Court said: “We find no basis in the 
[ApA] or in our opinions for a require-
ment that all agency change be sub-
jected to more searching review. . . .  
[T]he agency need not always provide a 
more detailed justification [for a change 
of policy] than what would suffice for a 
new policy created on a blank slate.” 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 
s. Ct. 1800, 1810–11 (2009). The 
explanation obligation applies to initial 
positions as well as to changed 
positions.
if the response it essayed in Hall is 
weak, does the government have 
available a better response to the “failure 
to explain” argument? perhaps so in the 
Mannella context. The case law 
recognizes various exceptions to the 
explanation obligation. One exception is 
situations in which it is obvious why the 
choice was made. E.g., American 
Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 
F.2d 256, 269 (Ct. Cl. 1979). This 
accords with the venerable maxim that 
the law does not command the commis-
sion of meaningless acts.
Arguably, this exception applies as to 
the regulation imposing the two-year 
limitations period with respect to section 
6015(f) claims. Why are statutes of 
limitation ever created? The two standard 
reasons are finality and avoiding 
decisions based on stale evidence. 
perhaps these purposes are so routine 
that they are obvious reasons for the 
two-year limit in the regulation.
This approach may gain additional 
traction as a result of Mayo. some courts 
have used explanation failures as 
independent, sufficient-unto-themselves 
bases for invalidating regulations. Judge 
Ambro did not; he deployed the failure 
as part of his Chevron step Two analysis. 
in Mayo, the supreme Court held that 
Treasury may enlist enhanced adminis-
trability to establish the reasonableness 
of a regulation at step Two. Mayo, supra, 
131 s. Ct. at 715. The perhaps obvious 
finality and staleness reasons are part of 
administrability.
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iii. obligation to explain 
in future tax cases
Whatever the ultimate fate of Judge 
Ambro’s contention in the section 
6015(f) cases, does “failure to explain” 
have a future in other cases? i think the 
answer is “yes”—if taxpayers’ counsel 
are willing to immerse themselves in 
general administrative law enough to 
argue the issue skillfully.
it is clear that general administrative 
law does apply to tax rules and regula-
tions. With exceptions not here relevant, 
the ApA applies to all federal agencies, 
including Treasury and the service. 5 
U.s.C. § 551(1). Despite the desire of 
some to deny it, it has long been clear 
that tax is not exempt from general 
administrative law. The supreme Court’s 
unanimous Mayo decision ends any 
question in this regard. See Mayo, 131 
s. Ct. at 712–13.
Moreover, Judge Ambro’s opinion is 
not the first time the explanation 
As i argue in my March Tax Notes 
article, this argument was wrong and 
contorted the real meaning of National 
Muffler. in any event, the argument was 
decisively rejected in Mayo. See 131 s. 
Ct. at 711–14. it no longer is available to 
taxpayers, creating the need for 
aggrieved taxpayers to find other 
doctrinal bottles into which to pour the 
vinegar of their discontent.
That being so, one may expect 
taxpayers—in addition to pressing 
standard substantive contentions, such 
as that the regulation is inconsistent with 
the governing statute—to seek proce-
dural grounds on which to attack 
inconvenient regulations. One of those 
grounds may be a Mannella-style 
argument that Treasury failed to 
adequately explain and justify the 
choices it made in the regulation. it will 
be interesting in the years to come to see 
what develops along this front. n
obligation has appeared in a tax case. 
some (though not many) previous cases 
have addressed it. E.g., American 
Standard, supra; Georgia Fed. Bank, 
F.S.B. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 105, 
110 (1992). More cases entailing 
challenges to tax regulations would have 
dealt with this issue had it been raised 
more often by taxpayers’ counsel.
Mayo makes it more likely that 
counsel will wade into these waters in 
the future. in Mayo and in some other 
cases, taxpayers challenging Treasury 
regulations argued in part as follows: 
(1) National Muffler, not Chevron, 
provides the governing standard when 
tax regulations (especially general 
authority regulations promulgated under 
section 7805(a)) are challenged;  
(2) National Muffler is more rigorous 
than Chevron; and (3) the challenged 
regulation fails to pass muster under 
National Muffler. National Muffler 
Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 
440 U.s. 472 (1979).
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